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This  paper  examines  the  potential  impacts  of  subprime  carbon  credits on  the  impending 
Australian carbon market. Subprime carbon could potentially be created in carbon offset 
markets that  lack adequate regulation, as  projects face risks that can overstate emissions 
abatement. Recent research suggests that subprime carbon credits will likely cause significant 
price instability in carbon markets, with some authors drawing parallels to the US market for 
mortgage backed securities during the subprime mortgage crisis (Chan, 2009). To assess the 
impacts of subprime carbon credits on the impending Australian carbon market, carbon price 
fundamentals are examined using a marginal abatement cost curve for the year 2020. The 
2020 Australian marginal abatement cost curve is derived using a bottom-up model of the 
Australian electricity sector, as well as findings by the (DCC, 2009) and (McKinsey, 2008). 
Impacts are evaluated under several scenarios, which consider different trading scheme limits 
on the use of offsets; different proportions of offset credits that are subprime; and different 
emissions reduction targets. The results suggest that subprime carbon credits will always 
result  in  overall emissions  reductions  to  be  overstated,  while  sometimes  increasing  price 
volatility in the carbon market, depending on the steepness of the marginal abatement cost 
curve, the proportion of offset credits that are subprime, and the trading schemes limits on the 
use of offsets. We conclude that carbon markets could benefit significantly from a carbon 
offsets  regulator,  which  would  ensure  the  environmental  and  financial  integrity  of  offset 
credits. 
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1.  Introduction 
The treatment of carbon offset projects in emissions trading schemes is one of the most 
controversial  aspects  of  climate  change  policy,  and  since  the  Kyoto  Protocol’s  Clean 
Development  Mechanism  (CDM)  and  Joint  Implementation  (JI),  has  become  even  more 
important.  Controversy  arises  because  carbon  offset  projects  face  the  risk  of  overstating 
emissions abatement, and hence problems in generating legitimate carbon credits; a problem 
that allocated permits do not face. The risks most commonly cited concern the estimation of a 
projects  baseline  scenario;  assessing  additionally  or  carbon  leakage;  and  the  incentive 
incompatible nature of projects, and are discussed in more detail in section 2.  
  
Concerns over the robustness of regulation in carbon offset markets have led to concerns that 
carbon offset markets may be under-regulated, with risks not been properly managed. One 
possible outcome of under-regulation, as discussed in (Chan, 2009, Bumpus, 2008, Rajan, 
2009, Lohmann, 2009), is the creation of subprime carbon credits. Subprime carbon credits 
represent credits generated by an offset project that has overstated abatement. Because of 
this, they are essentially ‘fake’ and do not represent true emissions reductions. These credits 
would  counteract  efforts  to  reduce  emissions,  as  credits  are  used  elsewhere  to  offset 
emissions. They also have the potential to create price instability in carbon markets, with 
some authors drawing parallels to the US market for mortgage backed securities during the 
subprime mortgage  crisis.  Furthermore,  under-regulation of offset  projects could create a 
‘market for lemons’, as described by (Akerlof, 1970), in which a large proportion of offset 
credits are subprime.  
 
This study aims to measure the impacts of subprime carbon credits on a 2020 Australian 
Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve. In constructing the MAC curve, an electricity sector  
 
model is used to derive abatement opportunities and relevant marginal abatement costs in the 
electricity  sector.  With  energy  usage  accounting  for  almost  two  thirds  of  global  carbon 
emissions (Stern, 2006), the general expectation is that the sector will be responsible for a 
significant proportion of reductions in future emission. The possible shifts in the availability 
of  abatement  opportunities  due  to  under  regulation  of  CDM’s  and  JI  credits  could  have 
significant effects on investment trends in the energy sector. The Electricity Supply Industry 
(ESI) will be expected to make significant efficiency gains over the next decade to improve 
its  emissions performance (Menezes et al., 2009, Ross  Lambie, 2010). With this general 
expectation of carbon emissions reduction this paper will examine the potential shift in the 
MAC and the consequences for carbon abatement opportunities in Australia. Studies by the 
Department of Climate Change (DCC, 2009) and McKinsey & Co (McKinsey, 2008) are 
used as a guide to calculate abatement opportunities and marginal abatement costs in other 
sectors. This paper proceeds with an overview of the regulation of these markets in section 2. 
In section 3 we will outline the methodological overview and in section 4 we move on to 
describe the construction of the MAC curve model. We construct the electricity sector model 
in section 5. In section 6 we use the results from the electricity sector model as input into our 
MAC curve model from which we derive our main findings. In section 7 we provide our 
analysis and recommendations and then provide some concluding remarks in section 8. 
  
2.  Background 
 
2.1 General problems with carbon offsets 
 
Carbon offset projects face a number of risks that can overstate emissions abatement. This 
raises concern over the legitimacy of the carbon credits which are generated through carbon  
 
offset projects; a problem not faced by the permits allocated by a regulatory authority (De 
Sepibus,  2009,  Lund,  2010,  Schneider,  2007).  Difficulties  associated  with  establishing 
additionality and permanence, as well as difficulties in estimating the baseline emissions and 
carbon  leakage are identified as  the  key  problems  with carbon  offset projects  (Paulsson, 
2009).  A  typical  example  is  the  problem  of  establishing  permanence  in  long  term 
sequestration projects, where plantations are at risk of burning down or been cleared. As well 
as this, carbon offset projects are largely regarded as incentive incompatible, with the usual 
business safeguards promoting fulfilment of contract been weak (Repetto, 2001).  
 
Several researchers, such as (Bumpus, 2008, Chan, 2009, Lohmann, 2009), argue that these 
problems, combined with a lack of verification or regulation, is likely to create an offsets 
market lacking environmental and financial integrity. Several researchers have also expressed 
concern over the integrity of offset credits in the Kyoto Protocol, which are regulated by the 
CDM and JI executive boards (Haya, 2007, Schneider, 2007). 
 
Problems with verifiability could also lead to carbon offsets markets developing into a market 
for ‘lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970, Obersteiner et al., 2000). Because buyers of offset credits are 
unable to determine whether the offset project has generated additional emissions reductions, 
companies selling offsets will have an incentive to sell non-additional offsets, because they 
are  cheaper  to  deliver,  and  pass  them  off  as  additional.  It  is  generally  acknowledged 
throughout the literature (for example, see (Downie and Institute, 2007) or (Repetto, 2001)), 
that in the absence of rigorous offset standards, carbon credits could be generated by projects 
where  it  is  difficult  to  guarantee  the  creation  of  additional  reductions  in  greenhouse 





Additionality is the requirement that emissions after an offset project are less than those that 
would have occurred otherwise (Drew and Drew, 2010). Establishing whether a project is 
additional is difficult offset projects often have parameters which are hard to observe or are 
subject to change (Chan, 2009, Chomitz, 1999, Grubb et al., 2010, Michaelowa and Jotzo, 
2005, Repetto, 2001, Schneider, 2007, Schneider, 2009). As well as this, the incentive for 
parties  to  deliberately  misrepresent  or  manipulate  parameters  of  the  project  further 
complicates the assessment of additionality (Chomitz, 1999, Repetto, 2001). 
 
The CDM and JI executive boards have come under scrutiny for being too lenient in their 
approval of carbon offset projects. Recent research, which assesses the additionality of  CDM 
projects, found many are not likely to be completely additional (Haya, 2007, Michaelowa and 
Purohit, 2007, Schneider,  2007, Wara and  Victor, 2008). For example, (Michaelowa and 
Purohit, 2007) analysed 52 approved CDM projects in India and found at least two approved 
projects that were not additional and 19 projects that should have been rejected by the CDM 
executive board. 
 
(Wara and Victor, 2008) examined applications for CDM credits resulting from renewable 
energy projects in China. They found that almost all new renewable energy and gas plants 
under construction in China applied for CDM credits. They argue that if these projects were 
additional, it would imply that no new hydro, wind or gas power plants would be developed; 
and  point  out that  this would  be unlikely  given  China’s five-year plan calling for major 
investments in hydro, wind, nuclear and natural gas-fired power. 
  
 
(Haya, 2007) found that of all hydro projects approved by the CDM executive board, more 
than one third were already completed at the time of the projects registration, and almost all 
were already under construction. This indicates that the hydro projects would have likely 
gone ahead without the CDM credits, suggesting they were mostly not additional. 
  
Such difficulties in assessing additionality, especially under a poorly regulated system with 
little oversight, is likely to result in some projects, which are not fully additional, obtaining 
credits for emissions reductions. Such non-additional credits, which are essentially worthless 
or subprime, will result in an increase in total emissions, as credits will be used to offset 




The emissions reductions resulting from offset projects depends on an unobservable BAU 
scenario,  the  measurement  of  which,  is  regarded  as  a  key  risk  in  quantifying  emissions 
reductions. Projects often have long time frames, which need to be compared to a long term 
BAU scenario which is difficult to measure, as it depends on a variety of economic, political 
and  technological  trends  that  change  over  time  (Chomitz,  1999,  Grubb  et  al.,  2010, 
Michaelowa, 1998, Repetto, 2001, Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010). 
 
As well as this, offset markets without a standardised methodology for the computation of 
BAU scenarios will likely result in the use of different methods among parties (Michaelowa, 
1998). This may result in parties attempting to calculate BAU scenarios in such a way that 
overstates a projects abatement.  
  
 
Carbon leakage  
 
Difficulties assessing carbon leakage also create problems for assessing emissions reductions. 
Carbon  leakage  arises  when  emissions  reductions  at  one  location  result  in  increased 
emissions elsewhere. (Chomitz, 1999) uses the example of a project that reduces demand for 
fuels, resulting in slightly depressed prices, to which consumers react by slightly increasing 
consumption.  
 
(Repetto, 2001) points out that leakage could also be driven by manipulation, in a similar 
manner to how corporations could shift profits among countries to reduce tax liabilities. He 
argues  polluters  could  concentrate  emissions  reductions  in  countries  in  which  they  can 
generate CDM credits and locate an offsetting increase elsewhere (for example shutting down 
an energy intensive industrial process in one country while outsourcing the process to another 
country) (Repetto, 2001). By not taking into account carbon leakage, offset projects will 
overstate emissions reductions (Millard-Ball and Ortolano, 2010, Repetto, 2001). 
 
Incentive incompatibility  
 
Carbon offset projects are largely regarded as incentive incompatible, as parties involved in 
the project have incentives to ‘cheat’ (Michaelowa, 1998). (Repetto, 2001) argues that this is 
because the normal business safeguards promoting fulfilment of contracts are absent or weak, 
as neither parties are concerned whether the emissions reductions have taken place, only that 
the buyer receives the title to the credits and the seller receives the payment (Repetto, 2001) 
p.311. This could lead to situations where parties attempt to overstate the actual emission 
reductions or skimp on implementation (Chomitz, 1999, Michaelowa, 1998, Repetto, 2001).  
 
 
Because of the incentive incompatible nature of projects, it further raises concerns over the 
legitimacy of project baselines and increases the difficulty in assessing additionality. It also 
raises  concern  over  the  extent  to  which  these  variables  can  be  manipulated  to  overstate 
emissions abatement, and hence allow projects to earn additional credits.  
 
2.2 Parallels to the global financial crisis  
 
(Chan, 2009) argues there are a number of similarities between carbon markets and the US 
market  for  mortgage  backed  securities  prior  to  the  financial  crisis,  with  some  research 
drawing parallels with the recent financial crisis (Chan, 2009, Lohmann, 2009, Rajan, 2009). 
The most common similarities include the creation of increasingly complicated assets, a lack 
of transparency in the securitisation of asset backed securities, the potential miscalculation of 
risk by credit rating agencies, and in some cases lenient government regulation (Ayadi and 
Behr,  2009,  Caprio  Jr  et  al.,  2010,  Chan,  2009,  Hull,  2009,  Mason  and  Rosner,  2007, 
Tymoigne, 2009). (Chan, 2009), (Ayadi and Behr, 2009) and (Lohmann, 2009) point out that 
carbon-backed securities are turned into increasingly complicated products which face similar 
asset valuation challenges to mortgage-backed securities prior the financial crisis. (Szabo, 
2008) points out that similar types of asset structures already exist in carbon markets; citing a 
Credit  Suisse  announcement  to  securitize  a  carbon  asset  which  bundled  together  carbon 
credits  (from  25  offset  projects  at  various  stages  of  UN  approval,  sourced  from  three 
countries,  and  five  project  developers)  in  late  2008,  which  was  split  into  three  tranches 
(representing different risk levels) and sold to investors.  
  
 
(Chan, 2009, Hull, 2009, White, 2009, Mason and Rosner, 2007), also point out the problems 
associated with credit rating agencies assess risk in carbon markets. They argue the failure of 
credit  rating  agencies  to  accurately  assess  the  risk  of  mortgage  backed  securities  and 
collateralised debt obligations prior to the financial crisis, could also occur in carbon markets, 
with some researchers arguing it could be as difficult, if not more so, to analyse the quality of 
the numerous underlying carbon offset projects, as it is to analyse US mortgages (for example 
see (Chan, 2009)).  
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3.1 Methodology overview 
 
To measure the impacts of subprime carbon, a marginal abatement cost model is used
1. The 
abatement opportunities for the MAC model are obtained through a bottom up model of the 
Australian electricity sector (outlined in section 4) as well as the results from (McKinsey, 
2008) and the (DCC, 2009).   
 
A MAC curve shows the set of optimal abatement opportunities available to reduce pollution, 
and is the basis for modelling carbon price fundamentals. The marginal abatement cost refers 
to the cost of eliminating an additional unit of emissions, and is assumed to be equal to the 




                                                
1 All dollars throughout this analysis are 2009-10 Australian dollars unless otherwise stated.  
 
Figure 1: A Typical MAC curve 
 
 
The  x-axis  shows  potential abatement  opportunities  while  the  y-axis  shows  the  marginal 
abatement cost. The boxes labelled A to F represent the potential abatement opportunities. 
The demand side of the model is the emissions reduction target, and is assumed to be binding. 
The  expected  carbon  price  is  the  marginal  abatement  cost  of  the  abatement  opportunity 
required to meet the reduction target, shown by the dotted lines. QT represents the emission 
reduction target and the corresponding marginal cost, PT, is the carbon price.  
 
In this study, the MAC model is will assign a carbon price under different reduction targets (5 
per cent, 15 per cent and 25 per cent reduction compared to 2000 levels, assuming all the 
policy and trends in place as at 2009) and different trading scheme limits on the use of offsets 
(we assume offsets are limited as a proportion of total abatement, at 10 per cent, 20 per cent, 
30 per cent, 40 per cent and 50 per cent). The impacts of subprime carbon are then analysed 
by  decreasing  the  size  of  the  offsets  abatement  width  on  the  MAC  curve,  to  reflect  the 
proportion  of  subprime  carbon  (we  run  several  scenarios  to  take  into  account  different 
proportions of subprime credits, these are 10 per cent, 20 per cent, 30 per cent, 40 per cent 














4.  Australian Electricity Sector Model 
 
4.1 Methodology overview 
 
The Australian electricity sector model is used to identify potential abatement opportunities 
in the National Electricity Market (NEM) for the purpose of constructing the 2020 Australian 
MAC  curve.  The  NEM  is  modelled  using  an  optimal  plant  mix  model  outlined  in 
(Simshauser and Wild, 2009) and (Wagner, 2011). The model uses a load duration curve
2 and 
annual equivalent cost curves
3 to determine the optimal generation mix
4 for the NEM using a 
partial equilibrium model constructed using a linear programme
5. Emission permit prices are 
added to the model to evaluate the optimal plant mix at each carbon price, and using an 
iterative procedure, allowing for optimal abatement opportunities to be derived. 
 
Only  combustion  technologies  are  modelled  this  way.  Renewable  energy  is  assumed  to 
contribute 10 per cent, or 22,500MWh to capacity (and hence a fixed abatement) with the 
most cost effective mix of renewable technology determined by optimal plant mix model
6. 
 
A typical construction is shown for a single year in figure 2, with the straight lines illustrating 
the above equation for increments of open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) plant, Combined Cycle 
                                                
2 A load duration curve is a representation of hourly electricity load, typically for a given year, with the data 
ranked in descending order. Each percentage of the annual capacity factor corresponds to a point on the load 
duration curve (in MWs). 
3 The annual equivalent cost curves represent the total cost for any year of installing and operating an increment 
of generating plant capacity, discussed in section 4.2. A curve exists for each technology and is projected over 
the annual capacity factor 
4 The optimal plant mix refers to the cost minimising mix. 
5 Once the cost paths are computed, cross over points are determined which shows the optimal plant mix. 
6 The 20 per cent renewable energy target is assumed to be part of the baseline. Given the intermittent nature of 
renewable power generation, it is assumed the maximum contribution of renewable energy is 30 per cent in 
2020.  
 
Gas Turbine (CCGT) plant and coal fired generation plant. In the direction of increasing 
annual capacity factor, OCGT is seen to give the lowest total cost until its cost line intersects 
that of the CCGT plant; which provides the lowest total costs until the coal fired generation 
line  is  encountered.  This  is  the  interior  solution  to  figure  2.  In  order  to  calculate  the 
appropriate MW of capacity each plant type contributes, the intersection points are referred to 
the load duration curve as shown by the dotted lines in figure 2. 
  






Renewable  Energy  Certificates  (RECs)  are  assumed  to  be  $40/MWh.  Inclusion  of  a 
$40/MWh REC price is consistent with artificial price floor imposed on the REC market 
(CSIRO, 2010). Gas Electricity Certificates (GECs) are not included in this analysis, as it is 
uncertain that the scheme will continue beyond 2015.  
 
All generation technologies under consideration in this analysis are assumed to be perfectly 
available in 2020. The generation technologies included in the model are shown on table 3. 
Carbon  capture  and  storage,  hydro-electricity  and  nuclear  power  are  not  expected  to  be 
available for deployment in 2020. 
 
4.2 Definition of Variables 
 
Discount rate   
 
For the purpose of this analysis, a post-tax real weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is 
used.  A  post-tax  WACC  is  used  because  of  the  importance  of  depreciation  for  capital 
intensive plant such as power stations (ACIL Tasman, 2009).  
 
The post-tax nominal WACC is expressed as: 
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(1)  
Where 
•  E is the total market value of equity  
 
•  D is the total market value of debt 
•  V is the total enterprise value (value of debt plus equity) 
•     is the nominal post-tax cost of equity 
•     is the nominal post-tax cost of debt 
•     is the effective corporate tax rate 
•  G (gamma), which is the value of imputation tax credits as a proportion of the tax 
credits paid. 
 
The  nominal  post-tax  WACC  is  adjusted  into  real  terms  using  the  Fischer  equation  as 
follows: 
 
                     
 1                        
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Long run inflation is assumed to prevail at the midpoint of the Reserve Banks official target 
range, at 2.5 per cent. The basis upon which inflation is applied to all subsequent modelling is 
at  full  CPI  against  operating  cost  streams,  and  only  three  quarters  CPI  against  revenue 
streams. The pass through of inflation (ρ), throughout this modelling will be considered to be 
ρR=75% for revenue streams and ρC=100% for non-finance related operating costs. 
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Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs escalation will be at the rate of           3% in 
accordance with the aforementioned cost stream pass through rate (Simshauser and Wild, 
2009). Variable t is defined to represent a discrete time index starting in the first period of the 
projection  horizon  and  containing  N  time  periods  (i.e.      1,…, )  with  parameter  N 
corresponding to the useful life of the plant (given on table 3). 
 
Short-Run Marginal Cost 
 
The SRMC is used to calculate the annual equivalent cost and is defined as a period of time 
where at least one input variable remains fixed. In the case of power generation, the short-run 
is usually defined as being a period where generation capacity remains fixed. Therefore, the 
SRMC is the incremental cost incurred from an increment of output (i.e. 1 MWh) from a 
generation technology.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, the short-run is defined as a period of one year. Therefore the 
SRMC can be defined as being the additional cost incurred from producing an additional 
MWh on average over the course of the year. The SRMC is used in calculating the AEC 
($/kW/year) for each technology type. The cost of carbon affects the cost of power generation 
by contributing to the SRMC. 
 
All of the relevant inputs that form the SRMC are: 
•  The average marginal thermal efficiency for a station over the year 
•  The average fuel cost incurred over the year 
•  The average marginal variable O&M costs incurred over the year 
•  The average marginal emission factors and permit price over the year  
 
 
The estimated SRMC for each power station is calculated using the following formula; 
 
                               
   
1000
                (4)  
Where: 
•  SRMC is the short-run marginal cost on a sent-out basis (in $/MWh) 
•  HR is the heat rate on a sent-out basis (in GJ/MWh) 
•  FC is the fuel cost (in $/GJ) 
•  VOM is the variable operating and maintenance cost on a sent-out basis (in $/MWh) 
•  EIF is the emissions intensity factor (in kg CO2e/GJ) 
•  EPP is the emissions permit price (in $/tCO2e/MWh) 
•  REC is any benefit derived from the production of certificates under the Renewable 
Energy Certificates Scheme (in $/MWh) 
 
Long-Run Marginal Cost and the Levelised Cost of Energy 
 
The long-run is usually defined as a period of time in which all inputs can be varied. In the 
case of the generation sector the key difference in inputs that can be varied is the capacity of 
the generation fleet. In terms of generation technologies, the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) 
is typically referred to as the levelised cost of energy (LCE) which represents the long run 
cost  of  the  technology  amortized  over  the  estimated  economic  life.  This  allows  the 
comparison of plant costs that have different economic lives. Therefore, the levelised cost is 
defined as the cost of an incremental unit of generation capacity, spread across each unit of 
electricity produced over the life of the plant. 
  
 
The LCE for each plant is estimated based on a discounted cash flow (DCF) model. In broad 
terms calculating the levelised cost of a new entrant plant involves calculating the present 
value of the time profile of annualised plant costs deflated by the time profile of revenue 
accruing to the plant over its lifespan. This is then adjusted by the amount of power that is 
expected  to  be  consumed  internally,  referred  to  as  auxiliary  load  and  represented  by  an 
expense weighting factor ‘Aux’. The present value of total costs and total revenue are given 
by;  
                   
 
(5)  
                    (6)  
Where; 
•  TCPV is the present value of total costs 
•  TRPV is the present value of total revenue 
 
It is assumed that the revenue stream is proportional to the output of each plant. The revenue 
stream for each generator is calculated by applying the assumed revenue inflation escalation 
rate to the output generated by each respective generator. This is given by; 
                           (7)  
Where; 
•        is the revenue stream of each generating plant j 
•        is the energy generated by plant 
 
 The costs considered include all costs relevant to the investment decision. These costs are: 
•  The capital cost (including connection and other infrastructure)  
 
•  Other costs including legal and project management costs 
•  Fixed operating and maintenance costs 
•  Variable costs over the life of the station (including the cost of emissions) 
•  Tax costs  
Total costs include the sum of fixed and variable costs. The fact that variable cost streams 
depend on the output of the plant has been taken into account by applying the cost inflation 
escalation rate to the output generated by each respective generator.  This is given by; 
                                              (8)  
Where; 
•        is the total costs by generator 
•     is the variable costs  
•        is the energy generated by plant in MWh 
•          is the ‘inflation escalation rate’ applied to generator costs 
 
Finally, the LCE is calculated as; 
             /      / 1         (9)  
Where; 
•      is levelised cost of energy ($/MWh) 
•      is the auxiliary load 
 
Annual Equivalent Cost 
 
The Annual Equivalent Cost (AEC) curves represent the total cost for any year of installing 
and operating an increment of generating plant capacity. It is the sum of its annual capital  
 
charges  (discounted  to  present  value)  and  the  product  of  its  operating  over  capacity  it 
contributes to the annual capacity factor. The cost path for each plant are given by a linear 
function which represents the total annual cost for the increment of annual capacity factor 
                 , where   is the annual capital charges of the increment of capacity,    
is its operating cost per unit of time and     is the percent (from zero per cent to 100 per 
cent) of capacity it contributes to the annual capacity factor. Once annual equivalent cost 
curves are calculated, cross over points can be determined which provides the optimal plant 
mix under a specified carbon price.   
 
In converting LCE (in $/MWh) to AEC (in $/kW/year) the following process is used; 
                                    8.76    1          (10)   
Where; 
•       is the short-run marginal costs (fuel, variable O&M and emission costs) in 
$/MWh 
•  8.76 is the number of hours in a year divided by 1000 
•     represents the proportion of total system capacity from the generation technology
7  
 
Emissions and Emissions Reductions 
 
Because emissions data is given in t/MWh it is necessary to convert the MW from the load 
duration curve into MWh. This is done using the following process; 
             8760       (11)   
Where; 
                                                
7 A percentage between 0% and 100% such that the sum of all annual capacity factor equals 100% (i.e. such that 
∑         100%  
    )  
 
•      is megawatt hours  
•     is the nameplate capacity in megawatts 
•  8760 is the number of hours in a year 
 
Given this, emissions reductions from switching from technology a to technology b (or from 
changing from a baseline scenario b using technology a) are calculated as follows; 
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(12)   
Where; 
•                 ,   is  the  reduction  in  MT  from  switching  from  technology  (or 
baseline) b to technology a. 
•       is megawatt hours from technology      ,  
 
Marginal Abatement Cost for Renewable Technologies 
 
The marginal abatement cost for renewable technologies is the additional cost of switching to 
a  renewable  technology  compared  to  the  baseline  divided  by  the  amount  of  emissions 
reduction relative to the baseline. This can be written as; 
 
      
             
 0       0   
 
(13)   
Where; 
•       is the marginal abatement cost (in $/tonne of abatement) 
•  Subscripts R and B represent renewable and baseline technologies respectively 
 
4.3 Model calibration 
  
 
Model calibration and assumptions are shown in tables 1 to 3. 
 
Table 1: LRMC of renewable technologies 
Technology  LRMC ($/MWh) 
Solar Tower  78.50 
Geothermal  36.16 
Solar Thermal  113.71 
Solar PV  96.22 
Wind  74.29 

















Table 2: WACC Parameters 
  Parameters  Value 
D   E  Liabilities  100% 
D  Debt  60% 
E  Equity  40% 
R   Risk free RoR
8  6% 
MRP   R    R   Market risk premium  6% 
R   Market RoR  12% 
T  Corporate Tax Rate  30% 
T   Effective tax rate  22.5% 
  Debt basis point premium  2% 
R   Cost of debt  8% 
G  Gamma  0.50 
B   Asset beta  0.80 
B   Debt beta  0.16 
B   Equity beta  1.75 
R   required return on equity  16.5% 
F  Inflation  2.50% 
post-tax real WACC  6.81% 
   
                                                













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Load Duration Curve Data 
 
Data used to construct the load duration curve for combustion technologies
9, and to calculate 
the potential contribution of renewable for the year 2020 is derived from the AEMO State of 
Opportunities (2009). 
 
The  specific  demand  forecasts  correspond  to  those  associated  with  the  50  per  cent 
‘probability  of  exceedance’  standards  which  reflect  demand  forecasts  that  have  been 
constructed using different assumptions about prevailing weather conditions and economic 
growth scenarios (AEMO, 2009). The baseline demand scenario is associated with a standard 




Baseline data is derived from CSIRO (2009). Baseline Emissions Intensity for the year 2020 
is expected to be approximately 0.94t/MWh. The average spot price in 2020 is expected to be 
$26.46/MWh (CSIRO, 2009). For the purpose of this analysis, this spot price is used as the 
baseline LRMC.  
 
4.4 Model results 
 
The key emission permit prices that change the interior solution for combustion technologies 
are summarised in table 4. 
                                                
9 Load duration curve minus the contribution of renewables.  
 
 
For combustion technologies, model results show that from around seven per cent to 100 per 
cent of the annual capacity factor, the interior solution switches from coal based generation 
technologies to gas based generation technologies. For renewable technologies, zero per cent 
to 30 per cent of the interior solution consists of Biogas, while the remaining contribution 
consists of wind.  
 
Table 4: Model results 














Coal  to 
CCGT 
switching 
12 - 100  27 000  189.20  98.40 
Renewable 
27.20  Biogas  0 – 30  2 568  6.75  6.35
 
51.21










5.  MAC Model 
 
5.1 Model calibration 
 
The three emissions reduction targets (demand scenarios) are 5 per cent (138MT), 15 per cent 
(194MT) and 25 per cent (249MT) below 2000 levels by 2020 (DCC, 2009). The emissions 
trajectory out to 2020, without an emissions trading scheme, and including the 20 per cent 
renewable energy target, is assumed to be 664MT (DCC report).  
 
Only  the  sectors  contributing  the  bulk  of  emissions  are  examined.  Electricity  sector 
abatement  is  from  the  electricity  sector  model.  Forestry  and  agricultural  sector  is  from 
McKinsey (2008) and DCC (2009). 
 
It is assumed that significant abatement potential is available through carbon offset projects, 
whether they are domestic or via the CDM and JI
10, at $28/tCO2e, which is in line with recent 
forecasts (Chestney, 2011).  
 






                                                
10 In 2007, the CDM and JI accounted for almost 600Mt of pollution reduction under the EU ETS CAPOOR, K. 
& AMBROSI, P. 2009. State and trends of the carbon market 2009. Washington DC: The World Bank.. Further 
to  this,  global cost  curve  modeling  by  MCKINSEY  2008.  An  Australian Cost  Curve for Greenhouse  Gas 
Reduction. MCKINSEY & CO INC. indicates that significant abatement potential exists in developing countries 
below $40 per t/CO2e  
 
Table 5: Abatement opportunities  
Abatement Opportunity  Volume (MTCO2e) 
Marginal  Abatement 
Cost ($/MTCO2e) 
Agriculture, livestock  5  10 
Afforestation, pasture  20  25 
Forest management   10  27 
Biogas  6.35  27.20 
Carbon offsets  See table 6  28 
Coal to gas  98.40  37.50 
Refforestation  15  40 
Soil CO2  5  47 
Avoided deforestation  45  50 
Wind  14.81  51.2 
Afforestation, crop land  15  52 
Agriculture, waste  5  56 











Table 6: Offset opportunities 
Target 




5%  27.6  28 
15%  38.8  28 
25%  49.8  28 
20% offsets 
5%  69.0  28 
15%  97.0  28 
25%  124.5  28 
30% offsets 
5%  69.0  28 
15%  97.0  28 
25%  124.5  28 
40% offsets 
5%  69.0  28 
15%  97.0  28 
25%  124.5  28 
50% offsets 
5%  69.0  28 
15%  97.0  28 






The prevailing carbon price under each scenario is summarised in table 7. The carbon price is 
consistently lower under scenarios with a higher proportion of available offsets, suggesting 
that the MAC curve is sensitive to the limits imposed on the use of offset credits. 
 
Because of the large number of scenarios, only the 15 per cent reduction target, with 30 per 
cent available offsets is shown diagrammatically (see figure 3). The others are summarised in 
table 7.  
 
Figure 3: marginal abatement cost curve and corresponding carbon price under a 15 per cent 





























Soil c02 Afforestation, crop land 
 
Table 7: Summary Table 
 
Target (%)  Prevailing Carbon Price ($) 
10% offsets 
5  37.5 
15  50 
25  52 
20% offsets 
5  37.5 
15  47 
25  50 
30% offsets 
5  37.5 
15  37.5 
25  50 
40% offsets 
5  37.5 
15  37.5 
25  40 
50% offsets 
5  37.5 
15  37.5 




Table 8: Summary of Results 
% subprime   5% target  10% target   25% target 













10% limit on offsets 
10%  1.38  0  1.94  0  2.49  0 
20%  2.76  0  3.88  0  4.98  0 
30%  4.14  0  5.82  0  7.47  0 
40%  5.52  0  7.76  0  9.96  0 
50%  6.9  0  9.7  0  12.45  4 
20% limit on offsets 
10%  2.76  0  3.88  0  4.98  0 
20%  5.52  0  7.76  3  9.96  1.2 
30%  8.28  0  11.64  3  14.94  1.2 
40%  11.04  0  15.52  3  19.92  1.2 
50%  13.8  0  19.4  3  24.9  2 
30% limit on offsets 
10%  4.14  0  5.82  2.5  7.47  0 
20%  8.28  0  11.64  2.5  14.94  0 
30%  12.42  0  17.46  2.5  22.41  0 
40%  16.56  0  23.28  9.5  29.88  0 
50%  20.7  0  29.1  12.5  37.35  1.2 
40% limit on offsets  
 
10%  5.52  0  7.76  0  9.96  7 
20%  11.04  0  15.52  0  19.92  10 
30%  16.56  0  23.28  0  29.88  10 
40%  22.08  0  31.04  2.5  39.84  10 
50%  27.6  0  38.8  9.5  49.8  10 
50% limit on offsets 
10%  6.9  0  9.7  0  12.45  0 
20%  13.8  0  19.4  0  24.9  2.5 
30%  20.7  0  29.1  0  37.35  12.5 
40%  27.6  0  38.8  0  49.8  12.5 
50%  34.5  0  48.5  2.5  62.25  12.5 
 
6.  Analysis and Results 
 
Results are shown in table 8. In all cases, subprime carbon causes initial abatement to be 
overstated, with the overstatement much higher in scenarios which have a greater proportion 
of offsets allowed, as well as scenarios which have greater proportions of subprime carbon. In 
the  worst  case,  with  50  per  cent  allowable  offsets  and  50  per  cent  subprime  carbon, 
abatement is overstated by as much as 62.25MT (and as little as 34.5MT) depending on the 
reduction target. 
 
The price impact refers to both the short-term downward pressure caused by the increased 
supply of abatement opportunities, and also the longer term increase in price if information 
becomes available on which offsets are subprime (i.e. information asymmetries disappear). 
The  affects  on  price  caused  by  subprime  carbon  varies  significantly  between  different  
 
scenarios. This result can be attributed to the relative flatness of the MAC curve over some of 
the abatement opportunities (such as coal to gas) and at higher abatement levels (on the far 
right side of the MAC curve). The flatness of the MAC curve in this area means that the price 
will remain stable given small to medium size changes in the reduction target, or changes to 
abatement opportunities preceding it. Price impacts are typically larger in scenarios which 
allow more offsets to be  used, as  well as in  scenarios  which have a great proportion of 
subprime  carbon.  In  the  worst  case,  with  50  per  cent  allowable  offsets  and  50  per  cent 
subprime carbon, the price impact is as much as $12.50 (and as little as $0) depending on the 
reduction target. This is because the change in offset opportunities exposes the reduction 
targets to steeper sections of the MAC curve. 
  
The results suggest that the impact of subprime carbon on both abatement and price are much 
larger when a less restrictive limit on the use of offsets is imposed, this is to be expected, 
given that subprime credits make up a larger proportion of the carbon market. Furthermore, 
the results suggest that the MAC curve is sensitive to the limits imposed on the use of offset 
credits.  
 








Figure 4: Marginal abatement cost curve and corresponding carbon price under a 15 per cent 
reduction target, a 30 per cent limit on offsets and 40 per cent subprime carbon
6.1 Limitations of the MAC model
Price formation in a 2020 Australian carbon market will depend on more than just marginal 
abatement  cost.  Price  determination  involves  a  complex  interplay  between  emissions 
reductions  targets,  marginal  abatement  costs,  dynamic  technology  costs,  market  rule
government  policy  and  many  other  factors 
trading markets are typically international markets, so price formation depends on more than 
just domestic supply and demand. 
 
6.2 Limitations of the ESM model
The electricity sector model used to compute the abatement opportunities in the 
sector is a bottom-up model. Bottom
significant detail. The high level of technical detail is argued to be their mai
(Delarue  et  al.,  2009,  Shukla,  1995)
existing and future technologies and attempt to identify cost m
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Limitations of the MAC model 
Price formation in a 2020 Australian carbon market will depend on more than just marginal 
abatement  cost.  Price  determination  involves  a  complex  interplay  between  emissions 
reductions  targets,  marginal  abatement  costs,  dynamic  technology  costs,  market  rule
government  policy  and  many  other  factors  (Blyth  et  al.,  2009).  Furthermore,  emissions 
trading markets are typically international markets, so price formation depends on more than 
just domestic supply and demand.  
Limitations of the ESM model 
sector model used to compute the abatement opportunities in the 
up model. Bottom–up models most often represent the energy sector in 
significant detail. The high level of technical detail is argued to be their mai
(Delarue et al.,  2009,  Shukla,  1995).  These  models are  based  on cost  information  about 
existing and future technologies and attempt to identify cost minimising combinations of 
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Price formation in a 2020 Australian carbon market will depend on more than just marginal 
abatement  cost.  Price  determination  involves  a  complex  interplay  between  emissions 
reductions  targets,  marginal  abatement  costs,  dynamic  technology  costs,  market  rules, 
.  Furthermore,  emissions 
trading markets are typically international markets, so price formation depends on more than 
sector model used to compute the abatement opportunities in the electricity 
represent the energy sector in 
significant detail. The high level of technical detail is argued to be their main advantage 
.  These  models are  based  on cost information  about 





One problem with using bottom-up models is the inability to take into account economy wide 
effects and feedback effects (Springer, 2003). Furthermore, many bottom–up models do not 
endogenise  human  behaviour  (Springer,  2003),  so  consumer  and  producer  reactions  are 
determined by external assumptions rather than by the model. (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005) 
argue the second-order (or feedback) effects aren’t captured by bottom-up models are likely 
to be small in comparison to the primary parameters that shape the permit market.  
 
Another  problem  is  that  the  electricity  sector  model  includes  many  assumptions  for 
parameters that are uncertain and in some cases evolving rapidly. Parameters of most concern 
are  the future  cost,  performance  and  availability  of  different  technology  options.  This  is 
partially addressed by consulting a wide variety of parameter estimations. 
 
Finally, the electricity sector model does not directly take into account technological change 
or learning. The parameters used in the model and developed by (ACIL TASMAN, 2009, 
CSIRO, 2009) do take into account technological change.  
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Under-regulation of project-based mechanisms in dealing with climate change risk creating 
subprime carbon and a potential market for lemons. Few studies, if any, have explored the 
effects of such under-regulation and the affects of subprime carbon. The primary aim of this 
study has been to examine the potential impacts of under-regulation and resulting subprime 
carbon on an impending Australian carbon market. This study has used a MAC curve derived 
from a bottom-up model of the Australian electricity sector. Carbon offsets were then placed 
on the MAC curve under three separate demand scenarios, five different offset scenarios and  
 
five  different  subprime  scenarios.  We  find  that  subprime  carbon  will  always  lead  to  an 
overstatement  of  emissions  reductions,  and  can  lead  to  more  volatile  carbon  prices, 
depending on the emissions reduction target and proportion of allowable offsets. 
 
One source of uncertainly in this area is the modelling approach. More research is required on 
impacts  of  subprime  carbon  should  be  tested  using  other  types  of  models,  like  CGE  or 
integrated assessment models, in order to test whether the impacts are consistent and robust 
to different modelling techniques. Furthermore, the modelling technique used to measure the 
impacts of subprime carbon is highly sensitive to model assumptions, including the steepness 
of the MAC curve. Almost certainly, once a market for carbon is established with clear 
defined rules on the treatment of carbon offsets, potential impacts of subprime carbon will be 
easier to examine. 
 
Research  also  needs  to be  done  on  developing  a  robust  regulatory  structure for  Kyoto’s 
project-based mechanism as well as other carbon offsets projects, with increasing scrutiny 
over the regulation of the executive board’s ability to ensure the integrity of CDM and JI 
projects. 
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